Uncertainty Aversion, Robust Control and Asset Holdings by Anastasios Xepapadeas & Giannis Vardas
This paper can be downloaded without charge at: 
 
The Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Note di Lavoro Series Index: 
http://www.feem.it/Feem/Pub/Publications/WPapers/default.htm 
  







The opinions expressed in this paper do not necessarily reflect the position of 









Uncertainty Aversion,  
Robust Control  
and Asset Holdings 
Giannis Vardas and Anastasios Xepapadeas 
 












ETA - Economic Theory and Applications 
 
 












Optimal portfolio rules are derived under uncertainty aversion by formulating the 
portfolio choice problem as a robust control problem. The robust portfolio rule indicates 
that the total holdings of risky assets as a proportion of the investor’s wealth could 
increase as compared to the holdings under the Merton rule, which is the standard risk 
aversion case. With two risky assets an increase in the holdings of the one risky asset is 
accompanied by a reduction in the holdings of the other asset. Furthermore, in the 
optimal robust portfolio the investor may increase the holdings of the asset for which 
there is or less ambiguity, and reduce the holding of the asset for which there is more 
ambiguity, a result that might provide an explanation of the home bias puzzle. 
 
 
Keywords: Uncertainty aversion, Model misspecification, Robust control, Portfolio 
choice models 












Address for correspondence: 
 
Anastasios Xepapadeas 
Department of Economics 
University of Crete 
University Campus  
74 100 Rethymno 
Crete 
Greece 
E-mail: xepapad@econ.soc.uoc.gr 1I n t r o d u c t i o n
The assumption that asset prices are generated by a geometric Brownian mo-
tion and that consumers-investors know the associated true probability law has
been central in the analysis of portfolio choice models (Merton [15], [16]). In
economics the assumption that the true probability distribution associated with
an event is known, and thus the expected utility framework can be used as a
methodological framework, has come under some criticism because of its failure
to explain certain "puzzles" such as the observed equity premium puzzle, or
the investors home-bias puzzle. In trying to explain these puzzles attention has
been focused on the case where the decision maker faces pure uncertainty in the
Knightian sense, or ambiguity, and its preference relationship is characterized
by uncertainty aversion (Gilboa and Schmeidler [12])
There are two main approaches to the problem of choices when the agent
is assumed to be uncertainty averse. In the ﬁrst, the multiple priors model,
the decision maker may formulate his/her objective by attaching a probabil-
ity, say e, to a baseline prior and a probability (1 − e) to the inﬁmum of a
family of the disturbed priors around the baseline one. This is the so-called
e-contamination approach (Epstein and Wang [9]), which is consistent with un-
certainty or ambiguity aversion.1 In the second approach the agent considers
model misspeciﬁcation. In this approach the decision maker is unsure about
his/her model, in the sense that there is a group of approximate models that
are also considered as possibly true given a set of ﬁnite data. These approxi-
mate models are obtained by disturbing a benchmark model, and the admissible
disturbances reﬂect the set of possible probability measures that the decision
maker is willing to consider. The resulting problem is one of robust dynamic
control, where the objective is to choose a rule that will work under a range
of diﬀerent model speciﬁcations. This methodology provides another tractable
way to incorporate uncertainty aversion (e.g. Hansen and Sargent, [19], [20],
[21], [23], Hansen et al [24]).
Portfolio choice theory has been a prominent area of application of the above
approaches2 (e.g. Dow and Werlang [5], Epstein and Wang [9], Chen and Ep-
stein [7], Epstein and Miao [8], Uppal and Wang [31], Maenhout [25], Pathak
[26], Liu [13], [14]). The idea behind the use of robust control methods in opti-
mal portfolio choice is that the investor faces model uncertainty regarding the
assets’ price processes. Thus, although the available data used to estimate the
probability law characterizing the evolution of asset prices allow for the estima-
1Chen and Epstein [7], introduce ambiguity aversion to recursive multiple-prior models of
utility by considering κ − Ignorance which is a concept that allows diﬀerentiation between
ambiguous and pure risk cases.
2Monetary policy can be regarded as the initial area of application of these approaches
(e.g., Brainard, [1] Hansen and Sargent [23], Onatski and Stock [17], Onatski and Williams
[18], Soderstrom [29]). See also Brock and Durlauf [2], Brock, Durlauf and West [3] for
similar approaches to policy design and policy evaluation under uncertainty. Another area of
interest is environmental and resource management where uncertainty aversion can be used
to formulate the concept of the Precautionary Principle (Brock and Xepapadeas [4], Roseta-
Palma and Xepapadeas [27])
2tion of a benchmark model, there is a set of alternative models describing the
evolution of asset prices, which is also consistent with the data and could be
regarded as possibly true. In this set up the investor seeks a portfolio rule that
will work, in the sense of maximizing utility, under a range of diﬀerent model
speciﬁcations of the assets’ price equations.
In recent attempts to study Merton’s basic optimal portfolio choice problem
in the context of the Hansen-Sargent robust control methodology, Maenhout
[25] considers a two asset problem, a risky asset and a riskless asset for an
investor maximizing a CRRA utility function. The derived robust portfolio rule
is an adjusted Merton rule. When there is no preference for robustness, or to
p u ti td i ﬀerently, there is no concern for model misspeciﬁcation, which implies
that the so-called robustness parameter θ →∞ , this rule tends to Merton’s
rule.3 Uppal and Wang [31] extend the problem to the n asset case and derive a
generalized robust portfolio rule, which allows for diﬀerent degrees of robustness
associated with diﬀerent subsets of the asset price process. A central result
underlying the recent robust control literature in the portfolio selection context
(Maenhout [25], Uppal and Wang [31]) suggests that model uncertainty implies
cautiousness in the sense that the investor, under uncertainty aversion, will
invest a smaller share of his/her wealth in the risky assets relative to the share
implied by the standard Merton rule under risk aversion. In more general terms,
model uncertainty seems to have been associated in the earlier literature with
some kind of cautious or conservative behavior,4 although more recent results in
the area of monetary policy analysis under uncertainty seem to provide mixed
ﬁndings, that is aggressiveness or robustness depending on the structure of the
model.5
The present paper attempts to derive optimal portfolio rules under uncer-
tainty aversion by following Hansen and Sargent’s approach and formulating
the portfolio choice problem as a robust control problem. We derive portfolio
rules for the cases of two and multiple, i =1 ,...,n, risky assets. We also allow
for uncertainty aversion, or preference for robustness, both with respect to the
joint distribution of the assets, and, in the general model, with respect to the
distribution of each risky asset. Our portfolio rules are parametrized by the
robustness parameter θ.6 We show that as θ →∞the robust portfolio rule
tends to Merton’s rule in accordance with Maenhout’s results. However, under
uncertainty aversion, the associated robust portfolio rule indicates that the total
holdings of risky assets as a proportion of the investor’s wealth is not always
3The robustness parameter θ can be interpreted as the Lagrangian multiplier associated
with an entropy constraint, which determines the maximum speciﬁcation error in the asset
price equation that the investor is willing to accept (Hansen and Sargent [21]). As such it
is a ﬁxed parameter and characterizes preferences consistent with Gilboa and Schmeidler’s
axiomatization of uncertainty aversion. When θ →∞there is no concern about model
misspeciﬁcation and we are in the usual risk aversion framework.
4For example Brainard’s [1] results suggest caution in the face of model uncertainty in a
Bayesian framework.
5See for example Onatski and Williams [18] and the papers cited by them.
6When we allow for diﬀerent levels of ambiguity associated with diﬀerent assets, the port-
folio rule is parametrized by the vector θ =(θ1,...,θn).
3smaller as compared to the holdings under the Merton rule, which is the risk
aversion case, and which is equivalent to no concerns about model misspeciﬁca-
tion and θ →∞ . This result seems to depart from the belief that uncertainty,
or ambiguity aversion, and the associated robust control methods might result
in more cautiousness or conservatism regarding portfolio choices, in the sense
that holdings of the "risky - ambiguous" assets are reduced relative to the pure
risk case. We derive conditions under which such an increase in the total hold-
ings of risky assets takes place, which are independent of the form of the utility
function and the value of the robustness parameter θ.7 With two risky assets we
show that under certain condition uncertainty aversion could induce an increase
in the holdings of the one risky asset as compared to risk aversion. When this
happens the holding of the other asset is always reduced.8
Next we examine the case when the investor has diﬀerent preferences for
robustness for each asset, or diﬀerent levels of ambiguity regarding each asset.
For the multiple asset case we derive again conditions under which the total
holdings of assets increase under uncertainty aversion. For the two asset case we
show that in the optimal robust portfolio the investor may increase the holdings
of the asset for which there is less concern about model misspeciﬁcation (high
θ), or less ambiguity, and reduce the holding of the asset for which there is more
concern about model misspeciﬁcation (low θ),o rm o r ea m b i g u i t y ,r e l a t i v et ot h e
risk aversion case (θ = ∞). If we associate the asset with less ambiguity with
home assets and the asset with more ambiguity with foreign assets, this result
could be regarded as an additional explanation of the home bias puzzle.9
7The independence from the value of θ is desirable since θ is basically exogenous. There
have been attempts to eliminate θ from the portfolio rule as shown by Pathak [26]. Maen-
hout’s transformation of the robustness parameter θ to a time dependent function, with θ
being proportional to the value function of the robust problem portfolio, in order to make
the portfolio rule independent of θ, breaks down the consistency of preferences with Gilboa
and Schmeidler’s axiomatization of uncertainty aversion, and transforms the robust rule to
Merton’s rule with a lower drift of the asset price equations. Pathak shows also that the Uppal
and Wang [31] rule depends on a normalization factor which is taken to be proportional to the
value function as in Maenhout’s transformation. Pathak [26] avoids the transformation that
endogenizes the robustness parameter in terms of the value function by directly determining
the worst possible distortion in terms of an instantaneous relative entropy constraint. In this
case the robust portfolio problem is simply Merton’s problem with a reduced mean return, the
reduction deﬁned in terms of the worse possible distortion. (See also Chen and Epstein [7]).
It seems that since the exogeneity of θ is required in order for the problem to be consistent
with uncertainty aversion, robust portfolios are parametrized by θ. To estimate θ in order to
fully characterize the robust portfolio, Hansen and Sargent [19] suggest the use of detection
error probabilities.
8The extent to which the net result of these two opposite eﬀects will increase or decrease to-
tal holdings of risky assets depends on the conditions of the previous result which characterize
the behavior of total holdings.
9There have been a number of arguments attempting to explain the home bias puzzle.
Strong and Xu [30] explain the puzzle on the basis of optimism of fund managers towards
their home equity market. Serrat [28] considers nontraded goods to operate as factors that
shift the marginal utility of traded goods. This entails dynamic hedging policies which in turn
are consistent with the home bias puzzle, while French and Poterba [11] consider information
costs as an explanation of the puzzle. Our approach of providing a partial explanation to
the puzzle through uncertainty aversion is along the lines of the approach used by Uppal and
Wang[31] and Pathak [26].
42 Robust Portfolio Choices
We consider a market which consists of one riskless asset whose price evolves
accordingly to:
dS(t)=rS(t)dt S(0) = S0,t ≥ 0,
where r denotes the risk-free rate of return, and i =1 ,...,n risky assets.
Denoting by (α1,α 2,...,αn) the drift rates, or mean rates of return, and by
(σ1,σ2,...,σn) the volatility rates, the evolution of the prices P =[ diag(P1,P 2,...,P n)]
of the n assets, is given by:
dP = PAdt + PΣRdB (1)
where A,Σ,a r en × n diagonal matrices with diagonal elements αi,σi respec-
tively, R 10 is a matrix such that ΣR(ΣR)T is equal to the variance - co-
variance matrix and B =[ B1,B 2,...,B n]T 11 are n independent Brownian
processes, deﬁned on an underlying probability space (Ω,F),w i t hm e a s u r e
P = P1 ⊗ P2 ⊗ ... ⊗ Pn.
Merton’s solution ([15], [16]) of the optimal portfolio allocation problem for
an inﬁnite time horizon and n risky assets, determines the optimal portfolio















where V is the value function of the problem, VW and VWW are the ﬁrst and
the second partial derivatives respectively with respect to the wealth W, Υ−1
i st h ei n v e r s eo ft h ev a r i a n c e-c o v a r i a n c em a t r i xΥ, and U (C) is a standard
utility function.
Following Hansen and Sargent [22] and Hansen et al. [24], model (1) is
regarded as a benchmark model. If the consumer-investor was sure about the
benchmark model, then there would be no concerns about robustness regarding
model misspeciﬁcation. Otherwise, these concerns can be reﬂected by a family of
stochastic perturbations. Because there are n independent Brownian motions,12




hi(s)ds , i =1 ,...,n (3)
where { ˆ Bi(t):t ≥ 0} are Brownian motions and {hi(t):t ≥ 0} are measurable
drift distortions. Therefore the probabilities implied by (1) are distorted. The
10A typical element of matrix R c a nb es e e ni nt h en e x ts e c t i o nw h e nw ee x a m i n et h ec a s e
of two risky assets.
11Superscript T denotes the transpose of a matrix.
12T h i si st h er e a s o nf o rt h eu s eo ft h es p e c i ﬁcf o r mo fe q u a t i o n(1).
5measure P is replaced by another probability measure Q = Q1 ⊗ Q2,...,⊗Qn.
As shown by Hansen et al. [24], the discrepancy between the distribution P
and Q is measured as the relative entropy, R(QkP). At this stage we consider
distortions to the joint distribution of assets so we impose an overall entropy
constraint for all the n assets. Based on Corollary C3.3 of Dupuis and Ellis [6],
















The above equation allows us to consider n separate distortion terms, one for
each asset. However in order to reduce the complexity of the model, we initially
assume symmetric distorted measures Qi, and examine the case with the same
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j=1 Rij,13 is the ith element of the matrix, each of whose elements
is equal to the sum of the elements of the ith row of matrix R. Under model
misspeciﬁcation, a multiplier robust control problem can be associated with the






















In the above equation because of (4), θn = nθ where θ denotes the ro-
bustness parameter which takes values greater than or equal to zero. Thus it
is assumed that concerns about model misspeciﬁcation are the same for the
price processes of all assets. As shown by Hansen and Sargent [22] θ is the
Lagrangian multiplier at the optimum, associated with the entropy constraint
Q(τ)={Q ∈ Q : Rt(QkP) ≤ τ ∀t}. A value of θ = ∞, indicates that we are
absolutely sure about the measure P, with no preference for robustness. This
case can be regarded as the risk aversion case and the problem is reduced to
13For two assets we will see (in the next section) that: Rr1 =1 , Rr2 = ρ+
p
1 − ρ2, where
ρ is the correlation coeﬃcient.
6the standard Merton problem with the objective function given by (6).L o w e r
values for θ indicate preference for robustness under model misspeciﬁcation, or
uncertainty aversion, where a value of θ =0indicates that we have no knowledge
about the measure P.
Using the results of Fleming and Souganidis [10] regarding the existence of
a recursive solution to the multiplier problem, Hansen et al. [24] show that
problem (7) can be transformed into a stochastic inﬁnite horizon two-player
game between the investor and Nature. Nature plays the role of a "mean agent"
and chooses a reduction h in the mean return of assets to reduce the investor’s
life time utility. The Bellman-Isaacs conditions for this game implies that the
value function V (W,θ) satisﬁes the following equation:
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From the above system of equations, it can be seen that as θ →∞the
solution reduces to that of Merton’s standard problem given by (2). Using (10)
to eliminate h from (11), we obtain the robust portfolio weights, or equivalently,
the fraction of the wealth invested in each asset, as:
w∗





ij (αj − r) ,i =1 ,...,n (13)
where υ−1 is the inverse of the matrix:










and ρij is the correlation coeﬃcient of the benchmark model, between assets i
and j (σij = σiσjρij). In order to determine the change in portfolio weights
7induced by uncertainty aversion relative to the risk aversion weights, we subtract
from (2) the relationship (13) to obtain:14
W (wi − w∗
i )=W∆wi = A
n X
j=1
[Σ−1(Π−1 − D−1)Σ−1]ij(αj − r) ,i =1 ,...,n
(16)
where Π = RR0, is the correlation coeﬃcient matrix. If ∆wi ≶ 0, then uncer-
tainty aversion, as reﬂected in robust control portfolio choices, increases (de-
creases) the holding of asset i a saf r a c t i o no fw e a l t hi n v e s t e di nt h i sa s s e t ,
relative to risk aversion.
The change in the total holdings of risky assets as a fraction of wealth be-









[Σ−1(Π−1 − D−1)Σ−1]ij(αj − r) (17)
If ∆W ≶ 0, then uncertainty aversion increases (decreases) the total holdings
of risky assets i as a fraction of wealth relative to risk aversion.
To derive conditions under which the signs ∆wi, ∆W can be determined and
which are relatively simpler to interpret and present, we consider the special case
of two risky assets.
2.1 Two Risky Assets
We consider one risk free asset and two correlated risky assets, where ρ denotes
the correlation coeﬃcient at the benchmark model. In this case B =[ B1,B 2]T is
a vector of independent Brownian processes deﬁned on an underlying probability
space (Ω,F), with measure P = P1 ⊗ P2. Because of E(dB1d ˆ B2)=ρdt,w h e r e
E denotes expected value and dB1,dˆ B2 are correlated Brownian motions on
P1,P2 respectively, the evolution of the prices of the assets based on (1) is given
by:15
dP1(t)=α1P1(t)dt + σ1P1(t)dB1(t) t ≥ 0 (18)
dP2(t)=α2P2(t)dt + σ2P2(t)ρdB1(t)+σ2P2(t)
p
1 − ρ2dB2(t) (19)
Merton’s solution for the maximization problem (6) in the two risky assets
14For inﬁnitesimal changes in θ, this is basically a comparative statics exercise that charac-
terizes the derivative ∂w∗
i /∂θ.
15We have that for independent Brownian motions B1,B 2: E(dB1dB2)=0 , E(dB1dB1)=








































If we perturb each Brownian motion separately, the wealth equation be-
comes:
dW = w1(α1 − r + σ1h)Wdt+ w2
¡





+(rW − C)dt + Wσ1w1d ˆ B1 + Wσ2ρw2d ˆ B1 +
σ2
p
1 − ρ2w2d ˆ B2. (23)
In this speciﬁc case the Bellman equation for problem (7) subject to (23) is:


























where θ2 =2 θ and θ this time refers to the robustness parameter in the two





















jWσ2j = A(α2 − r)+Aσ2(ρ +
p





























































































S o l v i n gt h ea b o v es y s t e mw ed e t e r m i n et h ef r a c t i o no ft h ew e a l t hi n v e s t e di n












































Next we examine, as in the previous section, the changes in the robust
portfolio weights ∆wi = wi − w∗
i ,i =1 ,2 between risk aversion (θ →∞ ) and
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1 − ρ2 −1
¸
Σ−1.

































(1 − ρ2)(θ2VWW − V 2
W)
. (39)
10In the above equation, κ is always a negative number, so denoting the relative


















W∆w2 < 0 if ρ −
p
1 − ρ2 >λ . (42)
It can be seen that independent of the speciﬁc form of utility function and
the value of the robustness parameter θ, the fraction of the wealth invested in








fraction of the wealth invested in the second asset increases relative to Merton’s
weight if ρ −
p
1 − ρ2 >λ.I fw ec o m b i n e(42) and (41), it can be seen that it






1 − ρ2 <λ<ρ−
p
1 − ρ2. (43)
So both weights cannot increase at the same time due to uncertainty aversion. If
the fraction of the wealth invested in the ﬁrst asset increases relative to Merton’s
weight, then the fraction of the wealthi n v e s t e di nt h es e c o n da s s e th a st o
decrease relative to Merton’s weight. Furthermore, the holdings of both assets
decrease relative to Merton’s weights if ρ<
√
2/2, thus uncertainty aversion
results in an increase in the holdings of one asset for suﬃciently high and positive
correlation between the two risky assets.
The eﬀect of uncertainty aversion on the total holdings of both risky assets
is obtained by combining (41) and (42) as:
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1 − ρ2 −
1
σ
) >σ (1 − 2ρ
p
1 − ρ2) − (ρ −
p
1 − ρ2) (45)






If (45) is satisﬁed then asset holdings increase under uncertainty aversion.
These results can be summarized in the following proposition:
11Proposition 1 With λ, ˆ λ, σ, and ρ as deﬁned above, robust portfolio choices
under uncertainty aversion imply, for a market consisting of one riskless and
two risky assets, the following:













, t h e r ei sa ni n c r e a s ei nt h eh o l d i n g so f







1−ρ2 , there is an increase in the holdings of the ﬁrst risky
asset, relative to risk aversion, or ∆w1 < 0.
3. If λ<ρ−
p
1 − ρ2, there is an increase in the holdings of the second risky
asset, relative to risk aversion, or ∆w2 < 0.
4. An increase in the holdings of one risky asset under robust portfolio choices
implies a reduction in the holdings of the other risky asset.
5. When concerns about model misspeciﬁcation do not exist, or θ →∞ , then
the diﬀerence in portfolio choices between uncertainty aversion and risk
aversion vanish. ∆W → 0, (∆w1,∆w2) → 0.
6. If ρ<
√
2/2, the holdings of both assets decrease relative to Merton’s
weights.
Figures 1 and 2 provide a graphical exposition of these results. In ﬁgure














, robust control impliesa ni n c r e a s ei na s s e t
holdings. In ﬁgure 2 for parameter constellations such that the value of λ is






1−ρ2 , robust control implies an increase in the
holdings of asset one and a decrease in the holdings of asset two.
[Figure 1]
[Figure 2]
3D i ﬀerences in Preferences for Robustness
In this section we generalize our model to allow for diﬀerences in preferences for
robustness, or diﬀerences in concern about model misspeciﬁcation among the
diﬀerent assets. These diﬀerences can also be interpreted as diﬀerences in the
levels of ambiguity associated with the price processes of each asset.16
Following the robust control methodology, we solve the same problem as in
section 2, placing n diﬀerent penalty terms hi ,i=1 ,...,n and considering n
16Uppal and Wang [31] develop a framework that allows for ambiguity about the joint
distribution for all stocks being considered for the portfolio and also for diﬀerent levels of
ambiguity for the marginal distribution for any subset of the stocks.
12diﬀerent robustness parameters θi, one for each asset. Our results regarding
changes in asset holdings between uncertainty and risk aversion in the general-
ized model are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 2 Robust portfolio choices under uncertainty aversion imply, for
a market consisting of one riskless and multiple risky assets with diﬀerences in
ambiguity among assets, the following:
1. The change in the fraction of wealth invested in each asset, between un-
certainty and risk aversion, is:
W∆wi =
Pn
j=1[Σ−1(Π−1 − ˆ D−1)Σ−1]ij(αj − r) ,i =1 ,...,n.
2. The change in the total holdings of risky assets as a fraction of wealth





















For the proof see Appendix.
If we compare the above result with the corresponding one derived in section
2, we see that the only diﬀerence is that matrix D has been replaced by matrix
ˆ D, which incorporates the heterogeneity in robustness parameters.
3.1 The Special Case of Two Risky Assets
In this subsection we examine the case of two risky assets, with diﬀerent penalty
terms, h1,h 2, and robustness parameters, θ1,θ2. Following the proof of the
previous section, we obtain the following proposition:
Proposition 3 Robust portfolio choices under uncertainty aversion imply, for
a market consisting of one riskless and two risky assets with diﬀerences in am-
biguity among the two assets, the following:


























2. We never increase the holdings of both assets at the same time, relative to
risk aversion.








θ2 µ(1 − ρ2)
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, ˆ λ = a2−r
a1−r
For the proof see Appendix.
The ﬁrst condition of this proposition implies that if preferences for robust-
ness for asset one are low (high θ1) or the ambiguity associated with the price
13process for this asset is small, while preferences for robustness for asset two
are high (low θ2) or the ambiguity associated with the price process for this
asset is large, then it very likely that the holdings of the ﬁrst asset will increase
under uncertainty aversion. If asset one is a home asset and asset two is a for-
eign asset, then this result provides some explanation for the home bias puzzle.
Uppal and Wang [31] derive a similar result regarding the home puzzle bias.
They, however, use the normalization that essentially endogenizes the robust-
ness parameter and then breaks down the consistency of preferences with the
Gilboa and Schmeidler axiomatization of uncertainty aversion. Pathak [26] also
provides an explanation of the home bias puzzle using a two-asset model and
a κ − Ignorance framework, where the worst-case scenario is used to reduce
the mean return of the asset price process. There is a subtle diﬀerence between
our result and the κ − Ignorance, worst case scenario approach. In the latter
approach the worst case scenario means that the reduction in the mean return
of the asset price process is determined at the level where the entropy constraint
Q(τ)={Q ∈ Q : Rt(QkP) ≤ τ ∀t} is binding. In the robust control model
developed in this paper, the robustness parameter associated with the penalty
terms is the Lagrangian multiplier associated with the entropy constraint. In
the two-player game between the investor and Nature (the mean agent) de-
scribed by (8), the choice of the penalty term h by Nature, which reduces the
mean return, is not necessarily set at the constraint constants of the entropy
constraints but is chosen in a "penalty maximizing way" as shown in (50) of
the Appendix in the proof of proposition 2. Thus our result may be interpreted
as an additional explanation of the home bias puzzle using a diﬀerent angle for
incorporating uncertainty aversion. Furthermore since the holdings in each as-
set depend on the θs, this approach could associate the magnitude of the puzzle
with diﬀerences in uncertainty aversion between home and foreign assets.
4C o n c l u d i n g R e m a r k s
Robust portfolio rules suggest that total holdings of risky assets may increase
under uncertainty aversion relative to the risk aversion case, which is a result
that can be contrasted to results suggesting that robust methods in portfolio
selection imply a reduction in the total holdings of risky assets. Furthermore
under heterogeneity with respect to preference for robustness, robust portfolio
rules suggest that the investor might increase the holdings of the less ambiguous
asset and reduce the holdings of the more ambiguous asset, a result that might
provide an additional explanation for the home bias puzzle.
The robust portfolio rules derived in this paper are parametrized by the
robustness parameter θ, which is not endogenized in order to keep the model
consistent with the Gilboa Schmeilder axiomatization of uncertainty aversion.17
Thus our results should be regarded mainly as comparative static results in-
17Thus the full characterization of the robust portfolio rule requires estimation of θ,u s i n g
for example detection probabilities [23].
14dicating the direction of changes in risky asset holdings when preferences for
robustness changes, with the limiting ca s eb e i n gt h en op r e f e r e n c ef o rr o b u s t -
ness, which is equivalent to standard risk aversion. The fact that changes could
go either way depending on the structure of the model parameters suggests
that uncertainty aversion and adoption of robust portfolio rules should not be
associated with smaller holdings of risky assets.
15Appendix
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2
Suppose now, that we place n diﬀerent penalty terms hi for i =1 ,...,n and
consider the corresponding robustness parameters θi. In this case, the equation
for wealth dynamics takes the form:
dW =
µ
rW − c +
n X
i=1













wjσjWRijd ˆ Bi (46)



















The value function V (W,θ) satisﬁes the following equation:
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i=1

































,i =1 ,...,n (50)
n X
j=1
wjWσij = A(αi − r)+Aσi
n X
j=1
















ij (αj − r) ,i =1 ,...,n (53)
where ˆ υ
−1 is the inverse of the matrix:













16So in order to compare again the change of wealth invested in each one of the




[Σ−1(Π−1 − ˆ D−1)Σ−1]ij(αj − r) ,i =1 ,...,n (56)









[Σ−1(Π−1 − ˆ D−1)Σ−1]ij(αj − r). (57)
¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3
In this case the equation for wealth dynamics becomes:
dW =
h
w1(α1 − r + σ1h1)+w2
¡





+(rW − C)dt + Wσ1w1d ˆ B1 + Wσ2ρw2d ˆ B1
+σ2
p
1 − ρ2w2d ˆ B2. (58)




















The value function in this case satisﬁes:

























































jWσ2j = A(α2 − r)+Aσ2(ρh1 +
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Using matrices as in section 3, we are able to describe the solution of the above
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We examine the diﬀerence between the quantities given by (20),(21) and (69)








α1 − rα 2 − r
¤




















































(1 − ρ2)(θ2VWW − V 2
W)
. (73)
Thus if λ as in (40) then:





1 − ρ2 (74)
W∆w2 < 0 if ρ > λ (75)





.I f e q u a t i o n (75) holds then the right hand side of (74) is
always greater than one and the left less than one. So as in the case with the
same levels of ambiguity, we never increase the holdings of both assets at the
same time. In addition if we combine (71) − (72),w eo b t a i n :










µ(1 − ρ2) − σ + ρλσ + ρ − λ
¤
< 0 if (77)



















where again σ = σ2
σ1 and ˆ λ = a2−r
a1−r. ¥
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Figure 2: Changes in the holdings of each risky asset under uncertainty aversion
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